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17 September 1958

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

17 September 1958

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

*Taiwan Strait situation: There was no significant intelligence on Chinese Communist military activity on 16 September. A Soviet note to Japan warned it against permitting American forces to use bases there for "aggressive acts," in an apparent attempt to exploit Japanese fears of becoming involved in a US-Communist war.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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<u>UAR-Syria</u>: The suppression of the Baathist socialist newspaper in Damascus appears to be a move by Nasir against UAR Vice President Akram Hawrani, who used the paper to advance his views. Despite Nasir's efforts to suppress political parties, the strongly Arab nationalist Baath party has continued its political activities. Nasir may attempt to blame its leader, Hawrani, for Syria's economic and administrative woes.

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Nasir Moves Against Akram Hawrani

The suppression of <u>al-Rai al-Amm</u>, the Syrian Baathist party newspaper, on 11 September appears to be Nasir's first move in a systematic plan to cut down the influence of UAR Vice President Akram Hawrani and other Baathist leaders.

Hawrani was in the forefront of those who pressed for Syrian union with Egypt and had hoped that his party would dominate the Syrian political scene after union. However, Nasir ordered the dissolution of parties, which the Baath has attempted to resist. Its continued activities at times have run counter to Nasir's policies in the country.

Hawrani, who has helped engineer at least five military coups in Syria but subsequently fell out with coup leaders, may in time break with Nasir and attempt to work against Syria's union with the UAR, possibly with Iraqi Baathists. Open criticism toward the regime has been growing since early summer. Syrians who now dislike the UAR hold the Baath responsible because Hawrani was a moving force for union with Egypt. Nasir, through Abdul Hamid Sarraj, minister of interior for Syria, has overruled Hawrani on several occasions and may attempt to make him the scapegoat for Syria's economic and administrative woes. Lately Nasir has become increasingly irritated with the Baathist leader's attempts to thwart policy by publishing articles in al-Rai al-

Amm.

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South Vietnamese Government Anticipates Upsurge In Communist Violence

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President Diem, on the basis of captured documents
anticipates a sharp upsurge in Communist
guerrilla activity and terrorism. Americans and other for-
igners in Vietnam may be targets of assassination attempt.

Diem reports he has information that Communist cadres have been ordered by Hanoi to concentrate on disrupting three major economic programs now being implemented by his government-land reform, resettlement - land development, and agricultural credit. He believes the damaging raid last month on the large Michelin rubber plantation by a Communist-led band of some 400 rebels was part of this campaign.

The Vietnamese Government is taking all possible security measures within the limitations of the difficult terrain, which favors guerrilla warfare. Americans and other foreigners have been advised to take extra precautions, particularly when traveling in the provinces where numerous assassinations of minor Vietnamese officials have already occurred.

Saigon officials are also concerned over recent movements
by North Vietnamese Communist forces along the Laotian bor-
der and near the 17th parallel, which they feel are related to
Chinese Communist intentions in the Taiwan area. Diem has
placed his army on semialert and is considering civil defense
measures

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II. THE WEST

Scandinavians to Push for Peiping's Entry Into UN

Swedish Foreign Minister Unden told the British ambassador on 12 September that Sweden intends "to go all out" for Communist China's admission to the UN. Unden claims to have the complete support of Norway and Denmark. While the Scandinavians have already recognized Peiping and for several years have consistently opposed the UN moratorium on Chinese representation, the emergence of two NATO countries as leaders in the fight for Peiping's entry would further weaken Taipei's status at the UN.

The Scandinavian leaders are deeply concerned over the Far East crisis, and Unden in a 14 September speech stated that "it is indeed tragic that a trial of strength between two fighting Chinese parties about a few small islands...may be able to jeopardize world peace." He added that it was "absurd" that Chiang Kai-shek should represent the largest country in Asia at the UN.

Under apparently believes that with Communist China's entry the UN would provide the proper forum for discussion and negotiations regarding the offshore islands. The Norwegians and Danes are increasingly concerned over the danger of war, but out of consideration for their NATO ties may be less active than Sweden in pressing					
for Peiping's admission.					

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Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Special Adviser to the President

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The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

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The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

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Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior

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